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REGULATION OF BusINESs-SHERMAN ACT-CONCERTED REFUSALS To
DEAL NoT ILLEGAL PER SE-The government sought an injunction restraining the members of an organization of independent insurance
agents responsible for writing nearly 80 percent of the fire insurance in
the Cleveland, Ohio, area from carrying out association regulations.
Adherence to the rules was challenged as a conspiracy in restraint
of trade and an attempt to monopolize in violation of sections I and 2
of the Sherman Act.1 The regulations were designed to prevent the members from representing (1) mutual insurance companies, (2) branch office
companies which contribute to the agents a portion of their overhead
expense and, (3) insurance companies which operate branch offices
and solicit or sell direct to the insured. The restrictions were enforced
by threat of membership"forfeiture. These rules, the government pleaded,
amounted to concerted refusals to deal, i.e., boycotts, and as such were
alleged to be illegal per se. The defendant contended that "the restraints
imposed are reasonable in the light of the circumstances in which they operate." On motion by both parties for summary judgment, held, the rule
of reason must be applied to determine the legality of concerted refusals
to deal. 2 United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (N.D. Ohio 1956)
144 F. Supp. 684.
The frequent condemnation by the courts of concerted refusals to
deal has given rise to the suggestion that such practices are per se illegal.a
Some Supreme Court dicta4 appear on their face to affirm such a doctrine.

126 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1-2.
Using this standard the court granted the government's motion for summary judgment in declaring the "direct writer rule" (3), illegal; but overruled the motions by both
parties on the "expense contribution rule" (2) and the "mutual rule" (1) and retained
jurisdiction for a determination on the merits.
s See Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act,"
IO GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 309-313 (1942); 58 YALE L.J. 1121 at 1137 (1949). Compare
LAMB AND K.n-rnu.E, TRADE AssOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE §10.6 (1956).
4 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522 (1948); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 625 (1953). In United States v. New
Orleans Insurance Exchange, (E.D. La. 1957), 1957 CCH Trade Cas. 1]68,616, a case presenting facts very similar to those in the principal case, the court admitted that a contended status of per se illegality for boycotts has "much support from the authorities"
[apparently relying upon Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) and
the dicta in United States v. Columbia Steel, supra and International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)]. The court, unaided by this reasoning, proceeded to find the
challenged practices illegal as violations of the rule of reason. But cf. the attitude expressed by the court in Union Circulating Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1957), 1957 CCH
Trade Cas. 1]68,637, where a distinction is drawn between boycotts illegal on their face and
2
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These dicta seem open to question, however, since the schemes struck
down in the cases supporting those statements contained either unlawful
objects5 or the employment of illegal means.s Notwithstanding that group
refusals to deal restrain trade, courts in the past have held or indicated
that justifications may protect them from illegality where aimed at combatting unlawful relationships, 7 dealing with credit transactions,s preventing abuse by unscrupulous dealers, 9 or improvement of trade conditions
within an industry.10 Inherent in the concerted refusal problem is· the
necessity for a recognition of the important differences of purpose between
refusals designed to coerce or exclude third parties and those used as a
method of mutual control over the parties to the agreement with only an
indirect restraint on third parties.11 The restraints in the former class
represent the type which courts most quickly condemn.12 If the above
distinction is valid, it is submitted that the difficulty of identifying an
illegal refusal is aggravated by the common reference to all concerted
refusals to deal as "boycotts" since the unlawful connotations accompanying the term actually suggest the answer to the question to be decided.1 8
Against such an antitrust background the district court's refusal to follow
the Supreme Court dicta14 does not appear inconsistent with past applithose which require closer scrutiny before a determination can be made (citing the
principal case).
5 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)
(object was elimination of competition); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra
(object was destruction of "style piracy" competition); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and
Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (object was price fixing); Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904)
(object was restraining non-members free access to market).
6 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (use of dominant position to
limit outsiders' opportunities). The cooperative practices (spying, "black lists," etc.) in
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, note 5 supra, and Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra, were illicit means to accomplish an unlawful
object.
7 United States v. American Livestock Commission Co., 279 U.S. 435 at 438 (1929).
s See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). See also United States v.
Cincinnati Fruit and Produce Credit Assn., (S.D. Ohio 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,248
(permitted only cash sales to delinquents). Cf. United States v. First National Pictures,
282 U.S. 44 (1930); 29 MICH. L. REv. 909 at 914 (1931).
9 See Butterick Publishing Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 522 at 527.
10 See Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U.S. 553 at 597-599 (1936). Cf. Dior v. Milton, (N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas.
'1[68,418. But see Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra. And see Barber, "Refusals To Deal Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 847 at 874-876 (1955);
and Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act," 10
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 305 (1942).
11 See Barber, "Refusals To Deal Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
847 at 872-879 (1955); Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the
Sherman Act," IO GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 305 (1942).
12 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, note 5 supra; Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra; Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469
(1941).
18 Cf. the reluctance by the members of the Attorney General's Committee to use the
term "patent pool." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMnTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws 242 (1955), hereinafter cited as REPORT.
14 In principal case, at 698, the court respectfully states, "If the dicta are to be regarded as a prophecy of the court's adoption of the doctrine of per se illegality in future
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cations,15 and the rejection of a per se solution for concerted refusals
seems to echo the recent Supreme Court affirmation that it "has not receded from the Rule [of Reason]" as the keynote to antitrust enforcement.16 The "direct writer" rule in the instant case was branded unlawful because the members had restricted their freedom to contract with
the purpose and effect of restraining some insurance companies from
competing within the Cleveland vicinity.17 Neither benefits received
by the public nor protection of the insurance agent's expiration lists
from piracy by the insurers were deemed to justify this group action.
Lack of evidence and disputed questions of fact prevented further adjudication of the other rules, but the court's suggestion that the regulations would be permitted if they served lawful intra-group functions
though giving rise to slight restraints on outsiders is noteworthy.is The
presence of state insurance regulation which can serve as a restraining
force on self-help measures within this particular segment of commerce
relax.es the necessity of tight federal control, and is another persuasive
factor for applying the rule of reason to the instant case.19 Admitting
that every concerted refusal to deal restrains some trade, this court's approach is commendable in that it recognizes the need for some degree
of protection of self-regulatory trade association activities that realize
substantial benefits to its members and the public,20 and only indirectly
affect outsiders. In such instances a rigid per se illegality rule would
automatically condemn certain trade association activities compatible
with the public interest. Preservation of the rule of reason approach for
concerted refusal to deal problems would seem to be the more appealing
alternative, for it reserves sufficient latitude for the curtailment of unboycott cases, it seems reasonable to predict that its application will be limited to cases
where a combination seeks by coercion, intimidation, or threats to compel outsiders to
do or refrain from doing that which the group approves or condemns••••"
15 That Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, note 4 supra, and Associated Press v.
United States, note 6 supra, prominent cases with per se reputations, do not preclude
justifiable concerted refusals, see 58 YALE L.J. 1138 (1949). The REPORT 132-137 sanctions
a speedy finding of illegality where a concerted refusal to coerce outside parties is found
without recommending an absolute per se approach. See also Barber, "Refusals To Deal
Under Anti-Trust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 847 at 879 (1955).
16 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377 at 387 (1956). See
principal case at 698.
17 However, the court recognized in the instant case, at 700, that individual refusals
would be lawful.
18 Principal case at 706.
19 Cf. the Fashion Originators' Guild case, note 4 supra, and the Millinery case, note
12 supra, where no similar instrument of control over industry self-help measures was
present.
20 For excellent treatment of antitrust hazards connected with trade association activities, see generally LAMB AND Kn-n:u.E, 'TRADE AssoCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1956). For
a discussion of trade association usefulDess see Oppenheim, "Federal Anti-Trust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at
1171 (1952); Kirkpatrick, "Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act,"
10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 302 at 305, 396-405 (1942); REPORT 17. See also 32 CoL. L. REv.
313 (1932); 39 YALE L.J. 884 (1930); 26 VA. L. REv. 828 (1940), for further discussion of
activities connected with enforcement devices.
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desirable restraints measured by the facts of the particular challenged
situation and prevents a "mechanistic"21 approach that could be used to
preclude beneficial business restraints.22
Gerald D. Rapp

21 That antitrust enforcement expediency should take a back seat to the basic policy
of promoting competition see Oppenheim, "A New Look at Antitrust Enforcement
Trends," D1sr. CoL. B.A.J. lll at 120 (1950). See generally Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy,'' 50 MICH. L. REv.
ll39 (1950) advocating a restricted use of the per se approach.
22 See 58 YALE L.J. ll21 at ll40 (1949), suggesting that maintenance of this delicate
balance between lawful and unlawful concerted refusals is a desirable alternative to
illegality per se.

